i hope you are back here tomorrow morning at 7:00 eastern come and have a great day ahead. we will take you live next to a discussion on the role of iran that the u.s. has withdrawn from afghanistan, coming from the middle east institute, and it has just gotten underway. [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2021] >> immediately, they have to decide what kind of assistance if any they will provide and expect in return. iran will be looking at how the new regime treats its minority, and we will see countries in the region -- whether countries in the region will be working together to ensure a stable afghanistan which is in all of their interest, or that they

would be pursuing their own interests and creating new sources of tension. with these questions and others, we have a panel this morning that is well-qualified to provide some of the answers. after presentations by the panelists and some questions of my own, we will try to answer as many questions as possible in the hour that we have. to submit your questions, please use the q&a future which you can find on your resume screens. feel free to ask questions anytime during the panel. for those calling in by phone or watching the panel livestream, you can ask a question bite emailing -- by emailing. if you have any technical issues, please also use that email address.

allow me to introduce the panel. we have a resident from the atlantic council south facing center, director of policy and diplomacy of macomb and company, a lecturer at george washington university school of international affairs. next, a broadcaster and journalist out of prague. he began working with the radio in 2002 it he has been covering a wide range of topics on afghanistan, including stories

related to afghan women and youth and issues related to refugees in afghanistan and a borrowed -- abroad. alex is a director of the iran program and a senior fellow with a front tier europe initiative. he specializes in police regional affairs with a focus on iran, a prolific author. his latest book came at just a few months ago. i will just say that i am marvin

weinbaum, and now i'm going to turn to our panelists and begin with asking --to lead us off. >> thank you. thank you for organizing this event. i will start with iran's strategy. a couple of months back i was looking at the role of the regional powers, and it struck me of knowing that how these powers are trying to -- i will

come to that at the end, but let me start with some major strategy against iran around the ideology and economy. and the trends that iran will also see, ideology, security and economy. let me start with the security element, and that is so much connected to the ideology element. iran has always welcomed these forces, no doubt, but it has consumed the path of tension

with the taliban back in power. but track relating to the taliban takeover and the emergent of anti-iran sentiment, it is something that is a major threat moving forward, going forward. it goes back to the past where tele van -- where the taliban behavior --it also goes back to 1990's for the relationship of iran and the taliban, where there was tension in the relationship, and in 1999

[indiscernible] so tele van -- the taliban relationship has been complicated in the past, but recently, the political processes come of that some call the peace processes, during these years iran has demonstrated support to the taliban. i think that strategy is moot because after one year of the talks, and especially -- tehran belief that the taliban would be the next power order.

[indiscernible] -- around the economic asset that iran has. the tension in afghanistan -- the taliban has demonstrated flexibility and expressed flexibility in terms of [indiscernible] , but one should be skeptical at this moment of any kind of political statement about their flexibility.

they went to get international recognition, the flow of money, so whatever statement they are making right now, with that it is hard to see how taliban goes forward, when their government will be in place, how they will treat this shiite population. and whether that will be a track forward of anti-iran sentiment. based on the previous atrocities of the taliban with this population, they could predict that they would not be flexible moving forward, but again, as they need international recognition and money to come, they might change. so the taliban be flexible if

tele van includes this population and whatever government they form, and the state would not have adverse policies to them, i think that ensures a positive signal of the relationship between the taliban and iran. if tele van would have adverse policies towards the shiite, that would create a sectarian aspect and that conflict could be a threat to iran security going forward. so we will need to wait and see their behavior with this part of the population that is around the ideology that i talked about, then that would further iran being able to submit the policy going forward.

that is one element. so that relationship night take shape, and they would be able to [indiscernible] but if that turns a different way, it could create conflict. on the other hand, there is also operation that maybe this conflict inside the taliban could have impact on that part of the population.

that conflict is one thing that we will need to wait in see in look closely at how the taliban behavior will be issued. the other element is currently the issue, around the iranian, going back again to the security elements, we all know that the economy has been hit hard by wide range of sanctions. iran is in crisis right now because of the sanctions, so the sanctions do not allow them to

get any more funding and aid, and therefore the flow has showed there is a high number of the population migrating to a ran out that the evacuation is being completed and now people are going to pakistan to escape the taliban. with that flow of refugees to a ran, iran will have more social economic issues, and that will cause more security issues inside a ran -- iran. and also issues with the drug trafficking. iran is concerned with this element, and they have to address that.

the third interest that ran has is the economic interest, and that includes several lucrative roots. afghanistan was one of the largest destinations for irani and non-oil exports, [indiscernible]

huge money for iran. due to internal economic issues in a ran -- iran, which may depreciate significantly, the iranian goods are more affordable to some buyers and afghanistan is a good consumer market, has been a good consumer market for tehran. i was just looking at the recent report that the tension from afghanistan [indiscernible] since then the reports show that that rate has dropped up, and that has had a huge impact on the trade and a huge impact on

the goods transported to that region. this could have a negative impact on trade in iran markets and they will lose the market if that tension arises again. these three major interests make a run back to have a policy of cooperation, a policy of flexible, flexibility with the next powerholder even if complication exists, and even if they do not like the taliban, even if they are anti-taliban, so iran has to cement a

relationship with the taliban. from the national interest perspective [indiscernible] -- and the second to have a deeper diplomatic strategy relationship with the taliban in order to -- and that would be what iran has to do. as i mentioned, there are other elements which are intervening

right now, the regional power element, the recent chinese investment with iran, all of these elements i see that iran is in the process, from these moving's from the street players, i analyze that it seems that iran's foreign policy in the region be based on cooperation with china and russia and the policy that they used to have, and that makes

sense, especially with another dominant version. iran does need more allies. pakistan is more closer to the taliban than iran, so iran itself in the current situation. it makes a lot of sense for iran to have a close relationship with them. we will have to wait and see.

>> thank you so much. it was very comprehensive, and i'm sure there's a great deal to discuss, and mustafa will take you in that direction. >> thank you very much for having me on this timely discussion. as you know, after 20 years of war, and this has raised many questions and concerns both inside and outside afghanistan.

what will happen next and what the future will hold for them, at the regional level, as the doctor mentioned, many stakeholders including iran, they have their own stakes and interests. they were repeatedly calling for a responsible use withdrawal from afghanistan. on interpretation of the phrase with sponsor for -- responsible withdrawal is for them to not be plunged into another bloody civil war and further instability and not should begin -- become a safe haven for natural -- national terrorists. the u.s. has said that the main purpose of this presence in afghanistan was to prevent it

from ever becoming a safe haven. international terrorists. every country in the region, especially neighboring countries , has specific objective that are linked to their national security interests. they have several major concerns. first the security of the borders, and the presence of extremist fighters with islamic state radical groups, and third, the influx of a new wave of african refugees into iran. i believe afghanistan operates under the banner of horizon, a historic region comprising of a large territory now situated in parts of today's afghanistan and

ran. they have attacked schools and sports centers and religious places and so on. it has been a security challenge for the neighboring countries and afghanistan. we know from reports that there are now more than 2 million undocumented and over 800,000 just turned african refugees in erin -- iran. the sanctions have forced the country to encourage many refugees to return to afghanistan, and we had reports from our correspondence that thousands have returned to afghanistan. now there is worry about an influx of more refugees, and we have seen reports that hundreds

of afghans have recently fled to iran after the fall of the provinces into the hands of the taliban. the united nations has announced that nearly half a million refugees would leave afghanistan by the end of the year, calling on neighbors to leave the borders open. our colleagues just recently talked to afghans who are now living in the city of -- the capital city bordering afghanistan and number of people said they had reached the city through difficult roots with the help of human trackers. and one of them said in order to provide food for his family, he

had to do harsh labor on the construction work. almost all of them said they were living under dire conditions. some of them want to reach turkey, but these days the gates of europe are also closed. these concerns have led iran to proceed with objectives linked to national security interests namely through proxies, some experts believe. let me give you an example, mike pompeo accused iran of using the taliban to undermine peace efforts without fighting specific details to support his allegations. he spoke of legit contacts with

the tora bora group, some groups that experts believe our taliban splitter groups. what is clear is that iran had relations with the government and taliban. in july, there was a meeting of representatives, and a day after the taliban took control of kabul -- [indiscernible] --adding that as a neighboring

nation, iran invites all groups to reach a national agreement. some countries such as iran are concerned. now the taliban has seized control of all of the countries strategic province, and we know there's been animosity for years especially during the first rain of the taliban in afghanistan in the 1990's, and the main question now is how iran will work together. you will recall, the foreign minister told one interviewer

that the taliban has committed many terrorist acts and added that iran has not removed the taliban. those remarks apparently upset the taliban. we recalled one spokesman called the remarks irresponsible and said such remarks by officials have the potential of harming relations between two friendly countries and said the islamic emirate is not on any human terror list. it remains to be seen that how iran's relations with the teller bound will be shaped in the months to come. thank you. >> thank you.

thank you for stressing some of those issues, and now alex, please. >> thank you. you have given us 10 minutes, so forgive me to try to go through a set of political points to get a sense of what i think is the policy debate. my remarks would be reflecting -- as opposed to the debate in kabul. i will talk about the official reaction so far, what is happening in afghanistan, and about scenarios in afghanistan, and about scenarios in terms of the taliban takeover kicking off a new geopolitical competition.

i will start off by giving a sense of how the reaction has been in tehran to the taliban takeover. given ideological opposition that they have had and continues to have in the united states, it is not surprising that the iranian official reaction has been one of joy that the u.s. withdrew in the way it withdrew. if you look at the state run media, it is painted as a picture of failure. there is no -- on the part of the iranians, no claim that they had a hand in the way the americans withdrew from afghanistan. there is no claim that the taliban a partner in waiting for iraq. that gives us a clear picture on

how iran is still on the fence. i would say that statement media in iran are sharing the same messages that you see coming out of russia and china, which talks about this issue in a broader context, the united states having failed afghanistan, about the general american decline, about the nationbuilding in the foreign policy agenda failing and afghanistan being a prime example. you can see the russians and the chinese in the iranians speaking the same language. there are also conspiracy theories in tehran, and it is not limited to tehran, which talk about why did the americans leave the way they did. it is a conspiracy theory, but this theory tells us that the

united states left the way it did to restart a new civil war in afghanistan with the mission being to pull russia, china and iraq into a new quagmire. it is a conspiracy theory, but it is one that is being mentioned and it is not limited to iraq. you see doubts, and now it is about the taliban, it is about the future. many officials and analysts are warning that the taliban is unchanged, and they are providing platforms to afghans to repeat the same mentions -- message, that the taliban has not changed, which i think is interesting. is not the official iranian line, but the fact that statement media are providing

platforms for those sentiments come i think that is telling. i would say the fear about the taliban taking over has really become more pronounced. a few words about the scenarios in terms of the internal afghan situation. some of our longer-term concerns , the economic issue, afghanistan has emerged as a key arc it for experts -- exports, about a $5 billion trade, not huge amounts of money, but for sanctions to hit them, afghanistan has become a lucrative export market, and

this market is now in doubt. it will hit some iranian exporters, and will it shift exports to afghanistan? i doubt it. the security issue has been mentioned. one thing we should remember is the return of civil war, and i think 2 million refugees in iran , there are no solid figures. some have naturalized, and obviously they do not count as refugees anymore, but afghanistan, the population has doubled in the last 20 years if i'm not mistaken, from something like 20 million to close to 40 million. so economic migration, fleeing

civil war, could be very different in terms of magnitude than anything iran has seen in the past. many will want to continue to europe, but at first instinct, ian and pakistan will have to take the burden. one thing you hear a lot is that the recommendations in tehran is to keep the options open, talk to everyone, talk to anyone including the taliban because you don't know what will happen in terms of the coming months as the situation is so fluid. the one thing you do here being

commended again and again from the official level and among the community of scholars looking at afghanistan and tehran is the need to push the taliban and those that support the taliban to accept the need for what they call a new course of government and that is a code for minorities to be included. this is a big question, will palestine want to do it alone? some of the names being mentioned at the core government does not suggest an inclusive government is in the making. the new taliban wants to go it alone, and that would mean a civil war. i just have to emphasize, this is being said very carefully. they do not want to upset the taliban.

they went to see what happens, if this taliban has really changed from the 1990's, which as you heard almost went to war over the killing of those diplomats. the other thing, iran doesn't talk about this taliban in the same way, and this is part of this wait-and-see keep your options open. we heard about security before, iran is playing that card very carefully. the state media has been very quick --[indiscernible] iran does not want to go there.

obviously isis is a different issue, but it does not seem to be the primary concern right now for the radiance, although obviously iran will always have to worry about elements emerging, that was the reason why they went to iraq and syria. if they believe isis will find a foothold in afghanistan, it will be tough to not do anything about it. time will show. i want to make sure that we have time for questions so let me go through my last set of points. iranians do not think the taliban can run afghanistan. they say to the past -- pakistanis, tell your friends that afghanistan has changed as a society, and if you want to

stay in power, you got to share our, and then you will find more regional states that want to support you. but if you want to be sectarian, then it will be a very different story. i think that is the message. can we go back to the zero-sum game of the 1990's, that is the question that we all want to ask. i think the iranians -- i don't think they will -- they don't think the taliban will play the sectarian card like they did in the 1990's. that is least -- that is at least one observation if not a hope. the idea of the right mentation of afghanistan as a country is not just about the question of refugees. we will go back to the conversations from the 1960's,

and the iranians are hoping that the pakistani do not like the idea of that government. i have many more points to go through and i want to spare you because they want to get to the q&a, but let me round up with some final remarks. iraq believes the taliban has changed. they have to find a way to work with them. iraq is in a state of wait-and-see stance right now, but it wants to make that inclusive government, and the first litmus test for the new taliban, if there is indeed a new taliban.

--and yet is a factor, the foreign minister is planning a visit to talk about the future of afghanistan. china was not a factor in the 1990's, and if you look at that taliban aid ship, china is a big hope for economics. what will that do to policies remains to be seen, but rest assured, ira has a look east policy, and if the chinese play their cards right,n perhaps they could interact -- integrate iran and pakistan as a way of integrating the region and helping the afghans economy as a way of stabilizing the country. basically i could go on.

>> i know you can. >> let me stop here and say it is an inclusive government, i want to repeat that one issue, it is the inclusive government in short-term that taliban, if they can bring others in, then iran could maybe work with this version of the taliban unlike the one from the 1990's. i will stop here. >> alex, thank you. let me observe the inclusiveness can be seditious as well, and i am sure that you all will understand that, that there may be the illusion of incorporation, but it is

windowdressing for the international community, and i think that very likely will be what we are going to see, but to really share power, it strikes me goes against the grain of the taliban. they did not come this far to share power. what are the consequences for what has happened here for the iranian-saudi relationship? the saudi's played a role in the 90's, they recognize that taliban and assisted them for a while. is there any application here for that? >> again, it is not the 1990's. saudi arabia today, they are obviously walking away from their religious fundamentalism,

and turning inwards. they are trying to cultivate the economy, so saudi arabia across the region is reconsidering geopolitical investments because they simply have not worked. the idea that saudi arabia right now will go back and repeat what did not work, i think that is far-fetched, and they will hope they don't have to. it could even be an opportunity for cooperation of sorts on a regional level including in ir an. saudi arabia and iran have had talks already in recent months, and there is hope that they will reopen sometime in the near future, so things have to really get much worse in afghanistan and we have to go to zero-sum

mentality before they would want to pull out the daggers and go at each other the way they did in the 1990's. best case scenario, there could be cooperation. >> what i see, it is not more about that region ideology anymore, it is more about the economic interest. the ideology is getting a second seat, and the economic interest is getting the first set in terms of the interest. that is why they are meeting. with all of that said, looking at all of the meetings going on, the investment that they are talking about, but the situation might change, and if there is a

civil war, and if there will be a sectarian conflict in afghanistan, then we would see the relationship between the groups command that ideology comes at that part is a major element, but for the time being, i look for ideology playing the prominent role. >> any new border consequences here for the u.s. iranian negotiations, does this change in any way the kind of way in which iran would approach those negotiations? anyone?

>> could you please repeat the question. >> i was saying are there any implications that these new developments for the ongoing negotiations between the united states and iran on the nuclear, revival of the nuclear agreement? >> i would leave that to our analysts in this panel discussion, but i would like to add a few words about your question regarding that the stakes has saudi arabia has in afghanistan. it is interesting -- for

example, hosted the taliban negotiations with the americans and also with the afghans, and we also know that it has tried to help the taliban resume operations in kabul recently. it was reported a delegation went to kabul, so there are reports that our analysts can talk about in detail that qatar and iran have had close ties, but iran and saudi have had tense relations in the past.

so this is where the rivalry between saudi arabia and qatar and iran can be considered in the context of afghanistan. >> if i may, over the course of the last few years, basically the iranians'method of operating, a big question, but i will put it like this, we talk to the west on the nuclear issue in one framework and we talk about every thing else separately, so we will divide the region. they don't want to talk about missiles or what iran is doing with their proxies. iraq fears that it will end up having to be asked to be more consistent, and that nuclear concessions could broaden to include nonnuclear concessions.

a third path forward exists which is to say let's talk about regional --afghanistan would be one of those. it should have a major interest on the part of the europeans to be involved. yet europeans, which over the course of the last 7, 8, 9 months have followed the lead by president biden and it will continue to do that on the nuclear watch, but making a lobby for washington to consider this third path which is to talk to iran, not about the missiles, but -- by the way the europeans are very concerned about the large number of refugees coming from afghanistan.

they just cannot handle more refugees. the third path requires iranian government to admit to the fact that this decline of american power, it might be a decline, but it will not happen overnight. why not talk to america and allies in the region as part of an effort to stabilize afghanistan? if u.s. me, that would be the smart thing to do for the regions. >> the reason i was raising the question is because it has been observed --and their cooperation in the execution of any kind of agreement has been critical, so i raised it that way.

we have some questions that i'm trying to absorb some of the questions as i go on. we have not talked about the women in inclusiveness. any thoughts on this regard? >> before coming to the inclusivity, i would to talk about the first one that you raised about the nuclear weapons and if it has any impact. i think afghanistan could have an opportunity for this, so getting closer as you mentioned to china and russia, it will make the iranian case stronger with negotiations with the united states. on the other hand, if

afghanistan plays a role here [indiscernible] opportunity for iran to proceed with the negotiation the united states. i think this is a business issue for iran, maintaining and building this business for iran, and the government is using all of the elements with taliban to become a strategic economic partner and as it marches towards the objective of getting a nuclear weapon, to use this opportunity, connecting with the taliban because it is a business issue. i think i would see also [indiscernible]

concept of inclusivity with the taliban making a case. they might shift positions but they are not in a position to share power with all other ethnic groups and with women, so they will not include women, and by leadership they mean the rules -- roles that women use to have, so this has been clearly said. i watched one argument, and you can see the status that they are not moving into those leadership positions.

they are not making a very logical argument at this point in time. it is clear that women will be allowed to work, clerical positions, but they will not allow -- decision-making role. there are campaigns going on in afghanistan to include women in the government and in decision-making positions that they used to employ. >> for so many women employed in the civil service, with their prohibition against men and women working together, i am wondering how you can have them engaged in offices where they have been working together with

men, so i think the very statement that they make that women can work is going to have some very strong qualifications. our time is now drawing to a close. due in if you want to make any final statements about perhaps anything we have not said? >> if you do not mind, just very quick, iran had been heavily investing in the iron world, and the presence of the united states in afghanistan was essentially a huge net gain for iraq. afghanistan obviously experienced instability and some

civil war with the taliban still operating, but iran did not have to wonder about the refugees, the drugs and the civil war next door, and now it has to. what i wanted to say is i wonder what this will do to the rainy and -- regional strategy of investing, in places like syria, which does not share a border with iraq, when they need those resources now, where you could potentially have to do with crises next door. this might have ramifications from the excessive iranian involvement, and the afghan situation might force them, because iraq has limited capacity because of the sanctions, and they want to see the foreign policy reflecting national security interest about protecting the homeland, as it

-- as opposed to pursuing more ideological said syria could bee of those. i do want to sort of went out that this could have an implication for iranian foreign policy in the region, and how that works out remains to be seen. we will watch the space. >> a observation. anyone else want to -- >> [indiscernible] and they are really pushing hard for it. we are pushing hard for international recognition. all these regional and neighboring countries, we do that to recognize them. in terms of inclusivity and control and relationship and better economic relationship with the neighboring countries and tons of assurance to the neighboring company.

-- neighboring countries. they should not make decisions or policies based on what their situation is right now. they are not -- they cannot be trusted at this particular time. they are in the space of consolidating power and getting recognition to the world. it could be [indiscernible] which i think will be problematic designing foreign policy at this particular time. other neighboring countries developing at this particular time is not really wise. >> his strike's me bringing together compatibility of wanting assistance, wanting recognition may run into their own belief system so that they can certainly welcome everything , but if they expect to get -- if others expect to get in return, the kind of person

performance -- performance that set of eyes that -- satisfies that, the taliban might like and ideological state and my dry line which would row clued getting the kind of assistance they want. any last thoughts that you want to express? our time has run out. >> yeah, you know, as it was mentioned, the international community had sent a message to the taliban that they will judge the taliban based on their deeds , not based on their words. we have seen a lot of remarks by the taliban. for example, they announced general amnesty and said that do not want to see the women to be

victims on that, they do not have issues with those who worked with the previous government, so we are receiving different reports from different parts of afghanistan, and for example, when we talk to women, they have -- women have bear the brunt -- bore the brunt of the last 20 years. in the last 20 years i have achieved a lot. it worked as it ministers, ambassadors, and they have have achieved tremendously in the past 20 years in various walks of life including sports, music, and art.

now, they are worried that now they do not to know what the future, what it holds for them basically. i interviewed just recently the former minister of women affairs and i asked her then the question if she things the taliban, there is a woman minister in the tele-band's cabin in the future and she said there should be women at the top positions, but just recently, we heard that one of the high-ranking taliban figures indicated that there might not be any women in top government

positions. they also talk about open and all-inclusive islamic government, but many ask what do they mean by an open and all-inclusive islamic government. there are questions that whether they are in -- their inclusive version of any political structure includes former players or figures in afghanistan such as the former president abdullah abdullah or others who, you know, fought against them, so there is, you know, a lot of un-clarity at

this point. it remains to be seen in the weeks and months to come. thank you. >> i want to thank the panel for a very fun panel this morning. thank also those of you who had submit questions. i did try to incorporate them into this discussion here. many of your questions. sorry if i don't get specifically to your question. also, i want the viewing audience being with us -- i want to thank the viewing audience for being with us, going over time here. this is i think certainly has opened up all kinds of possibility we will be following for some time. i think afghanistan is going to remain on our radar for some time, and